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The Younger generation takes over MI6: The ‘C’ saw of a thoroughly modern spook

by | Monday, 10th December 2018
A paragraph-by-paragraph decipherment of the unprecedented speech given by ‘C’ last week.

(Italics indicate the speech as originally delivered)

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be back at St Andrews. I had no idea that I would return one day as Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS – as we call ourselves – or MI6, as we are known to the world. After I graduated, I joined a Scottish Regiment. But within 4 years I found myself sitting in MI6 Headquarters, staring at a blank piece of paper. I imagine some of you might be familiar with that situation.

Hello, chums! In the old days, ‘C’ would anoint his successor from the Oxbridge pool, having assured himself that the chap had the same penchants as himself and was of the same bent. There were always plenty of Scots in the apparatus; one thinks of our wartime ‘C’, Sir Stewart Menzies, who told George VI that his head would roll before he would tell the monarch who our man in Berlin was and who most likely cobbled together the Zinoviev forgery and had the Commander-in-Chief of the Vichy French Navy bumped off after he’d defected to the Allies with some inconvenient knowledge. But now our happy band is floating to the surface and has no need of the old guard above us to keep up appearances. And regimental links can be highly useful to SIS; just ask Pablo Miller and Mark Urban.

I had been given, as my first job, the task of penetrating an organisation intent on genocide in the Western Balkans in the mid-1990s.

I’m talking about Yugoslavia but we don’t mention that nasty little word any more in my circles. I’d better not identify the outfit I reframed, or you might remind me that there are reliable sources indicating that the Clinton White House, the Wes Clark Pentagon and some of our Vauxhall Cross gentlemen instigated genocide around Srebrenica as an occasion to put in the ground troops. Anyone heard of that oik Tomlinson, whom I knocked around with out there in Slobo-land? Don’t read Estulin’s write-up of his whistleblowing in The Tavistock Institute, whatever you do.

Starting from that blank piece of paper, I had to find my way to the heart of that organisation and obtain secret information for the British government.

It took me to places I never thought I would visit, often travelling under a false identity. It involved many nights drinking obscure homemade alcohol, piecing together the intentions of the parties to that conflict, and allowing me to create the secret relationships necessary to provide the intelligence our country urgently needed.

Chaps, if anyone thinks ‘the British government’ saw hide or hair of one page of my CX, I’ve a case of Slivovitz to sell them. If it wasn’t discussed and voted on in Cabinet, then by definition it disappeared into a cabal and wasn’t used by Her Majesty’s Government — but here’s a moonshine toast to useful terminological confusion!

I had the satisfaction of knowing that my work, along with that of many others, helped to pave the way for the eventual arrest and prosecution of war criminals implicated in the murder or displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

Is John Laughland in the room? No? Then I’m probably going to get away with implying Milošević was a war criminal. How we guffawed when his posthumous exoneration by the ICTY was buried in the deliberations of another defendant’s verdict! As for mass displacement, the wholesale move of Albanians into Kosovo and Macedonia is turning out a beauty for our ongoing Balkanisation, but I’m sure you know that here at St Andrews, where it provides plenty of thesis material for your Terrorism Department.

Intelligence work on its own can’t stop every attack or prevent every evil. But it can shorten wars, and it can and does save lives.

Tittle-tattle, as they say, lost the battle; it didn’t win it. The trouble with Bletchley Park is that it shaved a year or two off the War and so the nascent Bilderbergers had to prolong it again by stymying Market Garden and starving half of Holland to give us time to extricate Herr Bormann and the Nazi loot. Op JB is the book for troublemakers to read on that little episode, or I believe that pesky Tony Gosling has given some talks on it since we kicked him out of the BBC for having his head screwed on.

That sense of pride at being part of an effort and cause greater than myself has never left me for a single day of nearly 30 years serving my country as an intelligence officer. I believe this to be true of every member of our organisation.

When I look back on those early days of my work with MI6 and ask myself how I was able to do it, I realise that it owes a great deal to this university. More than I knew at the time, St Andrews shaped me as a person.

The – how shall I put it – lack of distraction in this corner of Fife lends itself to deeper human relationships than are typical of university life.

St Andrews taught me to think in an open-minded way about the world. It taught me the value of the human curiosity and curiosity about humans that has propelled my career, and the career of the surprisingly large number of St Andrews graduates in the ranks of SIS.

Of course, St Andreans of older vintage than you lot were given a classic Scots master’s education, with a broad base of subjects and a first-principles inquiry approach. Nowadays, the university grandees here are the greatest cheerleaders for statism in the whole of Scots academia, and that suits my clique just fine. Fife has always stood gladly in the service of the deep state: its windswept coast is apt for darksome deeds, and no-one seems to be able to report on the industrial scale of child abuse in this ancient and royal county. Could it be something to do with the names involved? My lips are sealed in life and death, as Sir Stewart said.

For if you strip away the mystique that envelops our organisation, that is our fundamental role: we provide human intelligence.

I’m going to switch that in just a moment by lauding the artificial intelligence beloved of my anti-human masters and yours, but I hope you don’t notice.

Our task is to create human relationships that bridge forbidding cultural and linguistic boundaries, in some of the most challenging environments on earth and online. We do this for a specific reason: in order to obtain information and take actions required by the British government to keep this country safe.

There’s also an A-list of companies which we and the other agencies serve the private commercial interests of, but we don’t need to dwell on that, do we?

Our skill lies in our ability to create relationships of trust between our officers and people inside the organisations we need to understand. We call these brave people agents, and they put their livelihoods, and sometimes even their lives, at risk on behalf of the United Kingdom. That is why our people, our methods and our operations must always remain secret.

While I’m going to speak today about how the world is changing and SIS is changing with it, I do not expect our human intelligence role will ever change fundamentally. We will always need to understand the motivations, intentions and aspirations of people in other countries. Even in an era of artificial intelligence you need human intelligence, in fact it will become even more important in a more complex world.

Tempora mutantur, nos spooki et mutamur in illis. Oh, sorry, you’ve gutted your Classics Department now, haven’t you?

The degree of interconnectedness between nations, peoples and systems today, the ubiquitous nature of information, and the exponential pace of technological change, are making the world dramatically more complicated.

It’s getting a bit dramatic for my masters to keep tabs on all their Global Britain investments, and none of them cares a sou for sovereignty or national self-determination, either foreigners’ or ours.

This complexity has eroded the boundaries we have traditionally relied upon for our security: the boundaries between virtual and real, the domestic and the international, between states and non-state actors and between war and peace. The result is a world of far greater ambiguity.

Eric Blair knew what he was talking about when he described the new Westminster and BBC policy of generating a grey zone between war and peace. Kind of puts the kibosh on any fuddy-duddy considerations of just wars, wars of choice, wars of aggression, standing armies in peacetime, posse comitatus and all that inconvenient old bunk.

I want to be clear: our adversaries did not create this ambiguity and they did not create the things that divide us.

Oops, did I just admit that we did it?

But they have shown a keen willingness to exploit ambiguity in an opportunistic way, taking advantage of blurred lines to probe our institutions and defences in ways that fall short of traditional warfare.

We refer to these as hybrid threats. They include the cyber attacks, misinformation and disguised use of military force seen in Ukraine and elsewhere, combined with political obfuscation, or what you might call implausible deniability.

And that’s why my circle hived off the old CESG from GCHQ in Cheltenham and parked it in a sexy new building around the back of Whitehall. Now, the eager new information security recruits will hear nothing to challenge this make-believe world in which Britain can pin the blame for anything on anyone with a keyboard, and no-one gainsays us!

The good news is that we are far from powerless when confronted by these challenges.

We are better placed than most countries to cope with a world of hybrid threats, because of the strength of our alliances, our values, and our institutions. This includes the UK intelligence community. After all, ambiguity is the state SIS is constituted to dispel, but it is also the context in which we operate. We are at home with ambiguity. It is a new environment, but it is our traditional business.

Our hands are far less tied than those even of other Anglo-Saxon democracies, who have these pesky constitutional restrictions on how much their agency bosses can talk through their hats.

We are one of the few truly global intelligence agencies, capable of going to the source of problems anywhere in the world to recruit and run secret agents, penetrate terrorist organisations, provide our government with the intelligence it needs to safeguard the national interest, give UK authorities information they need to disrupt terrorist attacks at home and against our allies, and detect and counter efforts by state and non-state actors to traffic drugs or proliferate nuclear and chemical weapons.

And at this point, I hope you have images in your head of the Yanks and French as our only non-hostile peers in this domain, and don’t think of Mossad at all. Did I mention Mossad? Don’t think of Mossad. Put it out of your mind. It’s better not to think of them, I PROMIS you.

So SIS’s mission is a crucial aspect of our strength as a democracy, and as a member of the Western Alliance in the 21st century.

I’m not going to name any alliance that exists by dint of treaty or Parliamentary vote, just a nebulous one that no-one could possibly object to or peer more closely at. It sounds like motherhood and apple pie, doesn’t it, ‘Western Alliance’?

As Chief I rarely speak in public. I am a spy. And less is more. This is only my second public speech in 4 years; and you might have to wait quite a long time for another one.

Who knows, I might be long Beria’d by then.

But I am speaking today because it is vital that people hear enough about SIS to know what we really do – as opposed to the myths about what we do – and because we want talented young people across our country to join us.

While I am delighted to say that we recruit the very brightest talent, and have extraordinary young people working in our organisation, this is not something I will ever take for granted. We are going to need the most diverse and skilled officers possible in the years ahead. Because the reality of the world is going to become more ambiguous, and more complicated.

While I was St Andrews I also studied computer science. The radical thought in those days was that computers would soon be able to talk to each other. Now, billions of people and devices are connected worldwide.

There, I got my diversity bit out of the way. And I didn’t have to mention knowledge, factual education, patriotism, common law, the will of Parliament or morality once!

We are in the early stages of a fourth industrial revolution that will further blur the lines between the physical, the digital and biological realms. Lawfully used, technology such as bulk data, modern analytics and machine learning is a golden opportunity for society at large, including for MI6 as an organisation.

Normally, we senior spooks run a mile from the distinction between ‘lawful’ and ‘legal’, and we prefer to inculcate in our underlings a sense of that non-word, ‘legalities’, so that they root around in the extra-legal world of statutory instruments, executive orders, jurisprudence and Legal Advisor guidelines for their sense of the right. But this time, I’d better slip in ‘lawful’, as I’m all too well aware that our Cheltenham chums’ bulk data processing has often been illegal in statute law.

As for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, I rest secure in the knowledge that none of you has waded through Carroll Quigley’s turgid doorstopper Tragedy and Hope far enough to grasp that the same élite that burned through the Western world three times over (agrarian, industrial and financial crony capitalism) is at it again in their fourth crack of the whip, the possession of the ‘capital’ of the human mind. Never mind, he was Clinton’s history tutor at Georgetown, and the selected implementers do know this stuff. You don’t need to.

But I have also witnessed the damage new technologies can do in the hands of a skilled opponent unrestrained by any notion of law or morality, as well as the potentially existential challenge the data age poses to the traditional operating methods of a secret intelligence agency. We and our allies face a battle to make sure technology works to our advantage, not to that of our opponents. Liberal democracies should approach this with confidence, as the originators of this technology.

Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia. I don’t suppose any of you have been there, read much about it or speak the language, so I can say whatever I like at this point, can’t I? After all, the world must ‘work to our advantage’ and not to the benefit of the Russians; perish the thought.

But the twin drivers of technological change and international complexity mean that we have to keep adapting if we are to be as effective at spying in the future as we are today. There will be a dividing line between those Intelligence Services that grasp this, as the UK agencies have, and those services that don’t.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how my clique managed to hijack the two-bit intelligence agencies of Continental Europe, just like that. The twerps actually believe that we know what we’re doing. Effortless superiority, we used to call it.

The era of the fourth industrial revolution calls for a fourth generation espionage: fusing our traditional human skills with accelerated innovation, new partnerships and a mindset that mobilises diversity and empowers the young.

I officially open the SIS Social Work Department next week, and the crèche the week after.

Across the century of SIS’s existence, we have evolved continuously to confront each generation of threat: from the World Wars to the Cold War to the rise of transnational threats including international terrorism. Now, we are evolving again to meet the threats of the hybrid age – the fourth generation I am speaking of.

Admiral Cummings was probably a sociopath who recruited sociopaths, but we like to enshrine his memory at the Fort. I even still use green ink to mark my underlings’ work, in memory of his quirks. Speaking of ink, that Inkster never got my job, did he? I understand he has other ways of fulfilling his urges outside the Service these days.

This evolution takes 3 forms, that I want to describe to you:

I was never taught to spell out numbers below ten. You see? It really is the case that anyone can be recruited these days.

First, when your defences as a country are being probed on multiple fronts at the same time, it can be difficult to see the totality of what your opponent is trying to do. Security in the hybrid world is therefore all about who can partner to the greatest effect.

In the UK, we call this the Fusion Doctrine, and it involves drawing together all our national capabilities to detect, deter and counter hybrid attacks and other threats to the United Kingdom.

We do so love that little word ‘our’ in our circles. It almost conveys the impression to the fools that we’re talking about publicly-accountable national assets!

When I joined SIS, operations were largely conducted by individuals, as the story of my blank sheet of paper on my first mission suggests.

And we can’t permit fully-stacked, independent minds being set to work nowadays on Her Majesty’s secret service. No, we bring them in blank and stuff them with templates and narratives once they’re in the door. It’s a pushover with this generation: you lot have been kept childlike into your twenties. Without the comfort blanket of an operational playbook, you’d be all at sea, wouldn’t you?

We now operate dynamic teams that draw on skills and knowledge across the whole of SIS: bringing together the formidable talents of our agent recruiters and runners, our analysts, our subject matter experts, our linguists, our data scientists and our technical and engineering officers – known to the public as Q branch.

We work more closely than ever before with our sister agencies M15 and GCHQ. We each have a distinct mission and culture, but we have found that everything we do is interdependent, and we have made a virtue of this. We are among the most closely integrated intelligence communities in the world.

Either I or a secretary typed ‘M-fifteen’ instead of the letter ‘I’. That’s how much esteem we have for Thames House south of the river.

The spirit of partnership extends further, to the police and other domestic agencies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, and the UK Armed Forces we often serve alongside.

We also draw on unparalleled partnerships overseas, including our Five Eyes allies the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, and our close and historic security relationships across Europe.

Now you’ve been lulled into slumber, I’m ready to spring this one on you. UKUSA, or ‘Five Eyes’, is a signals intelligence arrangement, and the human intelligence agencies — SIS, CIA, CSIS, ASIS and NZSIS — have never ever undertaken not to spy on each other’s realms. In fact, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte is now angling to join Five Eyes, and even he admits that it’s a purely SIGINT relationship and hence has nothing to do with SIS. What I’m doing, then, is pulling a Louise Mensch on you and using ‘Five Eyes’ as a broad-brush term for the interlinkage of the Anglo-Saxon deep states and corporate clubs.

The implications of the Brexit debate have been set out by Ministers. For our part as SIS, we will always work with our sister agencies to strengthen our indispensable security ties in Europe.

Stuff ministers, in other words. Did you see what I did there? The people can vote till they’re blue in the face; my lot are never, never, never going to let Johnny Continental go. Else how is he going to fight World War Three for us?

We also work with other partners across the world, to disrupt terrorist activity and counter other serious threats – but always on our terms, and based on our laws and our values as the United Kingdom.

Yes indeed, if a sweetener deal stops being conducted on our terms — one thinks of that oaf Muammar and his dreams of gold — we and our most intimate ‘partners’ certainly will overturn it, and that right early. We might even have had plans for just that from decades earlier, if you believe Shayler. I hope this spiel reassures you that we have never knowingly had quarries tortured. Don’t read Ian Cobain.

And did you spot that I didn’t say ‘based on British law’? That weasel word ‘as’ allows me to allude to Our Rules-Based International Order and still let you think I mean ‘we, the British nation state’. Only those in the know will understand this to mean ‘the rules and undefined values of our clique, posing as the United Kingdom’.

When you consider these concentric circles of partnership, and the breadth of skill, experience and trust that they encompass, it is not surprising that adversaries seek to offset their relative disadvantage through hybrid means. Indeed, when they can they will take steps to undermine these partnerships, and we must take action of our own kind in response.

So second, alongside our core mission of revealing the intentions of adversaries and giving the UK government strategic advantage overseas, our task now is to master covert action in the data age.

When I joined SIS, our principal task was finding out secrets. In a world of hybrid threats it is not enough to know what your adversary is doing. You must be able to take steps to change their behaviour.

I’ve just admitted to you that SIS is no longer all about discovering secret facts and has more of a brief to shape perception and control minds. But I trust you let that one slip past you in both its legal and its moral implications. Just let me keep assuring you that Russia Russia Russia is doing the bad stuff I say it is, and that will justify our doing those very things to you. After all, you haven’t noticed that ‘relative disadvantage’ is my way of admitting that my clique dominates the world anyway and has no justification for entrenching its rule any deeper.

This is primarily driven by the threat from terrorism – the ultimate manifestation of the eroded boundaries of the 21st century. SIS is the arm of government that has the ability to go overseas to the source of terrorist threats, and to disrupt them lawfully through our partnerships.

Of course, only a decade ago, we at SIS were humble enough to insist that we were a mere agency of the FCO and not even a policy-setting agency at that, unlike certain parts of the Security Service and GCHQ. But now, we are an ‘arm of government’ and we are nakedly all about changing foreign countries.

And I can tell you today, that since my last speech, we and our sister agencies have disrupted multiple serious Daesh attack plans originating overseas that, if successful, would have caused significant loss of life.

This includes an important contribution to helping European countries, particularly our French and German allies, prevent terrorist attacks in their countries or against their citizens.

I just hope none of you start looking into the question of whether some of the mujahidin sloshing around Europe had their heads turned by an SIS clique.

This has involved exceptionally difficult and dangerous work. We have asked our agents – the people who agree to work in secret for MI6 – to do extraordinary things and run great risks. And I will not hide from you that some have paid the ultimate price. Our country and our allies owe them a debt they can never truly know and never fully repay.

We are proud of the contribution we have made to the coalition action in Syria which has now come close to destroying the so-called Caliphate. This has had a welcome effect on the direct threat to Europe. But to be clear, if the tragic events of 2017 in the UK are not sufficient of a reminder, we face a persistent and evolving threat from terrorism, one that demands that we evolve in turn.

If you come back next week, I’ll give you a Russian-style list of the tonnage of each type of ordnance that Britain has dropped on ISIS in Syria. Honest. And I’d better be vague here in my allusion to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; in Manchester, it ‘evolved’ in a direction not exactly favourable to our secret planning. You can blame Blair, whom my lot assured we could use the LIFG to contain Gaddafi, but he’s out of Parliament and long past any accountability now.

You might think that countering terrorism was challenging enough. But now we face the additional complexity of the threats posed by nation states operating in the grey spaces of the hybrid era, which is a wholly separate problem.

If I named the alleged menace, at least a few you would be able to pick it apart. So I’d better call my allegation by a phrase that sounds rather redolent of something you’d find in a corner of the bathroom, and that will keep matters nice and unfalsifiable.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the NATO allies will be considered an attack on all, is the cornerstone of our defence and security. But it presupposes a clear distinction between a condition of war and a condition of peace – precisely the distinction that our opponents are seeking to obscure.

As allies we are determined to uphold and deepen our Article 5 commitment to each other’s security. But it is significant that we face adversaries who now regard themselves as being in a state of perpetual confrontation with us.

Now, how could the Russians and Chinese possibly have attained that conclusion? Surely not by considering the ramifications of what the British deep state did to them for the past century or three?

One of the most egregious examples of this was the attack in Salisbury, in which the Russian state used a military-grade chemical weapon on UK soil.

I’m not going to name it because I can’t.

We did not respond to this flagrant hostile act by emulating Russian tactics. Instead, we operationalised our values, our legal system, and our alliances. We exposed the perpetrators and coordinated the largest ever collective expulsion of Russian intelligence officers from NATO and partner states, significantly degrading Russian intelligence capability.

I’m not going to get into why the Russians had that many intelligence officers in Europe. Surely not because of the number of intelligence officers we had stationed in Russia?

When faced by these kinds of attacks, our approach with our allies is to seek to attach a cost to the behaviour. Our intention is for the Russian state to conclude that, whatever benefits it thinks it is accruing from this activity, they are not worth the risk.

We will do this in our way, according to our laws, and our values. We will be successful nonetheless, and I urge Russia or any other state intent on subverting our way of life not to underestimate our determination and our capabilities, or those of our allies. We can do this to any opponent at any time.

Note that I didn’t say ‘British’ but ‘our’ throughout that paragraph.

But I should emphasise that even as the Russian state seeks to destabilise us, we do not seek to destabilise Russia. We do not seek an escalation. If we see a change in Russian behaviour, we will respond positively. But we will be implacable in defence of our people and our vital interests.

We will continue to defend the rule of law and the international rules-based system robustly.

The two are, of course, mutually contradictory: the former is a treaty system in place since 1648, the latter a hackneyed phrase that we made the Maybot start trotting out about eighteen months ago. But to your little minds, they’re synonymous, aren’t they?

Our allies trusted in our intelligence in the aftermath of the Salisbury attack. We felt this as an act of solidarity and it meant a huge amount to us. But we have been clear to our allies that it was an act of self-interest on their part as much as one of solidarity. Whatever an adversary can do to us they can and have done to others.

They trusted ‘our’ ‘intelligence’ and I was laughing all the way to the bank. That’s the whole point of this business model — Johnny Continental will never say boo to a Brit in a suit! Don’t mention the Austrians, who bluntly told us they were not going to expel any Russkies for us. Kurz will be dealt with. As I just told you, we have ways of dealing with anyone anywhere at any time who gets out of line.

Our approach to attaching a cost to malign activity also applies to cyber attacks, as in February this year when the UK attributed responsibility for the NotPetya attack against Ukraine, which also affected the United Kingdom, to the Russian government.

Much of the evolving state threat is about our opponents’ increasingly innovative exploitation of modern technology. So simply put, we’ve got to innovate faster than they can. Indeed, future generations would not forgive us if it were otherwise.

This brings me to the third driver for change in SIS: the need to ensure that technology is on our side, not that of our opponents.

Now, our Israeli chums have always advocated this, and I’m sure they’re right. Who cares who built the hardware if the software is yours to manipulate?

The digital era has profoundly changed our operating environment. Bulk data combined with modern analytics make the modern world transparent, a fact which contributed to GRU embarrassment after the Salisbury attack. But it is also a serious challenge if used against us.

You lot don’t know that ‘bulk data’ means ‘visibility to a handful of US-based, City-steered corporations of most of the world’s traffic’, nor that ‘modern analytics’ means ‘getting the likes of Bellingcat on the case to blag at arm’s length for us’.

So we are evolving rapidly. Cyber is now our fastest-growing directorate. We are shifting our focus to the nexus between humans and technology. And for the first time, through the National Security Strategic Investment Fund, we are pursuing a completely different type of partnership with the tech-innovation community, giving the private and academic community the role we need and they deserve.

Secret Mind Control Service, here we come!

Ironically, the most profound consequence of the technological challenge is a human one. We are determined, of course, to attract people with an even higher level of technical skill to join our ranks, in the best traditions of Q. But my organisation will need to adapt even faster if it is to thrive in the future. And that will require people with new perspectives, capable of harnessing their creativity in ways that we can’t yet even imagine.

Or that I daren’t name yet.

It is why we are determined to attract people from the widest range of backgrounds to join SIS. This will enable us to bring the widest range of approaches to bear on solving complex problems and so make our missions even more effective.

People sometimes ask what causes me to lose most sleep at night. The answer might surprise you. The biggest risk that I see is a failure to make full use of the amazing talent in our organisation and in our country at large. As the leadership of MI6 we are determined not to let that happen.

We don’t have a directorate any more; that’s so twentieth-century. We now have ‘leadership’, a conveniently undefined ‘we’.

I believe in empowering those closest to the problem with the skills and authority they need to solve it. We delegate assertively. In the cyber age, newcomers will often be better equipped to solve problems than those, like me, steeped in experience can be. If you join us, you will be trusted to use your talents.

Once we’ve programmed the young minds, they’re safe pairs of hands who can be relied upon not to think unthinkable thoughts about the mission.

I have spoken of how SIS is pioneering a fourth generation of espionage – deepening our partnerships to counter hybrid threats, mastering covert action in the data age, attaching a cost to malign activity by adversaries and innovating to ensure that technology works to our advantage.

But while all these things change, there is one thing that will not alter, and about which there is no ambiguity, and that is our commitment to the values and laws of the United Kingdom.

Don’t mention the constitution or our common-law customs at any cost!

We understand that what we do we do in the public’s name, and that public confidence in what we do is fundamental to our success. Above all, we know that if we undermined our values even in the process of defending them, then we would have failed.

SIS operates in secret, but secret does not mean unaccountable. Our actions are tasked and authorised by ministers and carried out only in support of government policies. And we are answerable to independent scrutiny by the Investigatory Powers Commissioners and oversight by Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee.

Above all, we are so grateful to the Chilcots and Rifkinds of this world for fulfilling those independent roles for us in such an independently independent way of independence.

Alongside this duty to be accountable we of course have a duty to learn the lessons of the past.

I am one of the many SIS officers who have served in Afghanistan. After the 9/11 attacks I witnessed at every level in SIS a profound impulse to step forward into the line of danger. We felt that our organisation was one of the few that could make a difference, faced with a wholly new, and open-ended, threat from international terrorism.

I am proud of the courage and reflex to do the right thing that SIS demonstrated. But the government has acknowledged in its response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s recent report, that we were not fully prepared for the challenges that we faced in those fraught times. Some of our officers were sent into a situation for which they were not fully prepared, and it took SIS too long to rectify that.

Cough cough, rendition, cough cough.

The report made hard reading for those of us who want our service to be the best it can be. But be in no doubt that we will learn the lessons.

Not to let the cat out of the bag again, that is.

So fifteen years later, we have improved our operational policy and practice, strengthened our training and guidance, and we now operate within an enhanced oversight and operational framework. And I’m proud that the Committee also concluded that SIS has the values and resilience to meet the current counter-terrorism challenge.

Above all, I have unshakeable faith in the quality, humanity and decency of the men and women who choose to join SIS. When faced with some of the very worst behaviour and dangers that humanity can devise, their instinct is to put themselves forward in the service of their country, and their fellow men and women.

We want people from across our country who feel a similar call to service to consider applying to join our ranks.

I have spoken at St Andrews today because of the deep affection I have for this university, and because you are one of the best in the world for the study of terrorism, international relations and artificial intelligence. But my message is to students in every school, college and university across our country. In particular, I want to speak to young people who have never seen themselves in MI6.

The stereotype is that we only want a certain “type” to join MI6. This is false. If you think you can spot an MI6 officer, you are mistaken. It doesn’t matter where you are from. If you want to make a difference and you think you might have what it takes, then the chances are that you do have what it takes, and we hope you will step forward.

It is the greatest honour of my career to lead the women and men of MI6. I believe the more you knew about what they were doing the prouder you would be.

What I haven’t mentioned to you lot is whether they know what they are doing nowadays.

You can tell a lot about the soul of a country from its intelligence services. In SIS, we have a service rooted in and inspired by the values of liberal democracy, determined to defend our country and the international rule of law, and carrying out remarkable and highly effective work in the face of potent threats, with creativity and courage and integrity.

These are the qualities that allow us to be the secret front line, to stand between this country and danger, and to help create an international environment in which our country and our people can prosper and thrive.

Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is nothing I would more delight in being than the pilot of Britain’s soul. What’s important is that we have Integrity. And we take Initiative.

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