This is the penultimate instalment of a five-webpage transcript of Dr Mike Yeadon's testimony to the 86th session of Stiftung Corona Ausschuss, held on 7 January 2022. Part I is here.
In this transcript, covering 1hr10' to 1hr45' in his testimony, Dr Yeadon answers questions on his presentation (transcribed as Part III).
In mid-February 2022, Dr Yeadon wrote the following to Alex Thomson:
I’m now coming to the [view that the] most likely conclusion is that huge variability in toxicity between some lots is down to incompetent manufacturing. This changes the murder charge but the fact of it is releasing recklessly made products.
A transcript follows of the questions put to Dr Yeadon and his answers. "Q:" denotes questions posed to Yeadon by the non-medical participants, Reiner Füllmich and Viviane Fischer.
Q: About those graphs with the X-axis: do we assume that there has been an alternation between the batches of the lots with the most adverse events between the three different companies—in the sense that, in a temporal dimension, not all of the adverse batches have been released at the same time? Can we can we deduce that?
A: No. There was an initial analysis done by one of the team, and they made the assumption—a reasonable, incorrect assumption—that the alphanumeric number ordering was the same as time-ordering of release of the vaccines. Because of that assumption, they produced a really worrying pattern of very toxic batches, then a gap, then slightly less toxic [batch], than a gap, and less toxic, and so on.
We can't make that deduction any more. It might be true, but I don't think that analysis was being done.
And similarly, we have not yet looked to see whether the most toxic Janssen batch was released at the same time as the least toxic Pfizer batch.
We would have to do additional work. Personally, I don't think that was necessary [anyway], because the manufacturer knows exactly where each batch goes: which [US] state, which medical centre, which office; and then eventually which patients.
If you know where every dose has gone, you could have toxic batches from more than one company being administered at the same time.
I think you're raising an implicitly very important question, because I think by [the mere operation of] chance, you would think there'd be sometimes an overlap and sometimes not. And if we if we see a pattern that looks non-natural, I think that would be additional strong evidence of premeditation. So we should go and do that, and it's a very good question. I can't answer your question, but I think I understand what was behind it.
Q: And about the patterns: whether we can assume that or not yet. And, as you answered, maybe we can [still] find out more. When we look at this graph, it seems that the adverse event numbers step up, and especially in the Pfizer one, and peak, and then step down. Is that, again, just the way that the batches have been organised around the X-axis, which is arbitrary; or could we see any pattern of stepping up and stepping down, which would [suggest] an experiment?
A: That bit does look real for any one manufacturer, if you just slice them out from from their others on that graph—because you can introduce date order for a manufacturer. If you look at that Pfizer block, I think it goes from left to right, from January 2021 to last month [January 2022], something like that. And so the general trend is to lowering of numbers of serious adverse events. What I don't know is: is that because the number of doses being administered per day or per week has that flattened off, because we're now mostly in the phase of administering what they call boosters or third doses? So or it could be [due to] a number of possibilities.
So why is the number of adverse events per unit time reducing now? It could be that the system is being played with, you know. It could be that we're simply not seeing all the data: they call that 'throttling'. I don't know what that [graph finding] means, but basically, somebody might be cheating and holding back some of those records. That's possible.
Comment by Dr Wolfgang Wodarg: They don't even need to put them in an order so that you can see a linear decline; they just can't do it in a way which seems to be arbitrary, which seems to be chance—but they know which batch contains what.
A: Yes, they do.
Wodarg: And they can have a dose and have this surge that those studies find, so frequency studies, and we don't see a systematic thing; we just see a big cloud of many dangerous batches, and then we see the baseline.
A: You're right, Wolfgang, you're absolutely right. The manufacturers can recreate the batch numbers and their empirical findings, and so I presume they know—
Wodarg: They know that. They can place them in different regions and they can supply them here and there, so that there is no systematic [finding] visible.
A: Exactly. That's another thing that actually I've got to mention: that if this was innocent, then you would expect, would you not, that a batch or a lot would go to on average the same number of [US] states each time: so whether that range is two to ten, or three to four, whatever it is, you would expect to be seeing the same kind of thing. It might vary a little bit—because obviously some states, like New York, California, Florida, Texas are very big, and others like Vermont or whatever are quite small—but as you smear the doses across the nation and go down the age bands, you would expect a batch that seems benign. It should go to the same number of states as the batches that turns out to be toxic, if it was innocent.
And we need to go and check this, but certainly, as of a couple of weeks ago, our findings were [that] the most toxic batches were going the largest number of states, and if that's confirmed, again, that's evidence of premeditation. How would they know ahead of time to distribute, to dilute, the most toxic batches across the largest numbers of states?
Wodarg: There is even this trick to disguise the whole thing, because they recommended, "[For] the first shot and second shot, take a different one"—and if you do this, it's even more difficult to find out the systematic [pattern] which is in it.
A: Good point. I think in most nations—actually, I'm not sure; I thought in most nations they got the same material [in each individual vaccinee], but they did mix them up, yes.
Wodarg: They did explicitly recommend to take a different [manufacturer's] one the next time.
A: And that's so crazy, Wolfgang, isn't it? The clinical trials were not done like that. So we've we have no safety data for that. And so when you see things like that, ladies and gentlemen, you should be very afraid.
Wodarg: There is there is one other dimension. We are just seeing the the very actual [in the sense of 'immediate'] reactions of the health reactions or toxic reactions; we don't [yet] see the long-term damage which may occur. And so something is in the cloud that we do not yet recognise. But because they have all the data and they have all the data collection of the people—whether with the health data they have, the vaccination data, they have the testing data, and they have the genetic data even, if they analyse the PCR—[therefore] they can really find out a lot by those trials in a few weeks [as heard], and find out whether the patents are worthwhile to be further developed.
A: That's a very good point you, make, Wolfgang, yes. Whilst we all know an unprecedented large number of people have reported injury, and indeed death—the numbers of deaths, you know, are huge for for a vaccine—but they're not large, say, compared with the normal death rate. In advanced, plump, elderly, Western populations, you're somewhere around one per cent, just under one per cent, of the population—mostly the old people—who die every year.
And if the vaccines have killed as many as one in a thousand—which is like a tenth of that—it would be awful and a terrible crime, but it's not on its own going to move the needle on population.
But if they if they do propose either to return with more toxic materials in the future—or, to Wolfgang's point, maybe 9,999 people haven't yet learned what's in store for them—you know, if you've been if you've been given one of these materials, I just don't know what's in it. Does that prime you for a very serious medical event if you should encounter some second stimulus? If I was a bad person, I could definitely design some nasty things using this technology, easily.
Wodarg: Mike, you have the experience. You know how long it takes to prepare such a study. And it is not just a study which is just improvised, but it seems to me this is an experiment they prepared at least ten years ago, because you have all those vaccines that now are running in trials: 128, says the WHO, with the two of them with self-replicating viruses. And this was published long ago. We just heard it: the veterinarians tried it out with animals already, self-replicating viruses, and now it's in the clinical studies with all those 120 different—
A: Yes, Wolfgang is saying—and he's absolutely right, I can exemplify—[that] it's far too fast. If those programmes were initiated in response to December 2019 and onwards, then that's just two years, something like that. [As regards] the pre-clinical phase—the the amount of time we would spend in the lab thinking about it, doing experiments, optimising, selecting the drug candidate, manufacturing it, doing toxicology—you would be extremely unlikely [to get it done in two years]. If anyone had got into the clinic, maybe you could go more quickly these days. But if they're all in Phase Two [already], I'm afraid!
Wodarg: You know better than anyone: those people know what they want to show to their investors and what they want to hide.
A: That's true. That's very worrying, yes.
Q: I'd like to ask like two things. Is it possible to see what kind of age group were affected by the respective toxic batches? And the other thing is, when we talked about this beforehand, you said that there's maybe only very few people needed to do these kind of variations if it's done on purpose. I mean, it wouldn't change anything, because obviously it's out there to see for everyone, both for government and for the pharmaceutical companies themselves, so if it was like a natural process or just a problem of production, they would immediately interfere and change the system or try to resolve the problem, or even like put like a moratorium on it, or something like that. So it's clear it's very likely that it's something like purposeful [wrongdoing] that's going on. But how many people would you actually see to be involved, and also, would it be possible to look at age-toxicity?
A: I've noted that question. It's a good one. I will get back to the team. and I think it might be useful to have a different person from the team [address that], because there are so many very good questions that they may know the answers to, and I just don't. As I said, I'm not the actual analyst.
But to your your question about how many people would need to be involved: it's rather worrying that it might be a very small number. If you think about it, these are basically gene sequences, so either sequences of RNA bases, one joined to another, or DNA bases. And we have machines that will synthesise that.
And then, once you've synthesised it you can then copy it: ironically, using PCR—it was originally invented as a manufacturing technique, not an analytical technique.
So the process is fully automated. Once you program what it is you want the machine to make—and maybe it makes it in pieces: as I was describing for a drug substance earlier, maybe it's made in a few pieces, and you warrant each of the pieces is what you want, and then you anneal them together using molecular biology—that could be how they do it. But when the machine is humming away and manufacturing the gene sequence, it looks exactly the same to a supervisor or a shift worker putting raw materials in. Whatever it's making looks exactly the same.
So it could be as little as one controlling mind for the whole thing, certainly per company. You don't have to have a team of forty concentrating on [it] and arguing. If all you're going to do is change the code, one person would be enough.
Of course, I don't know what they're doing. Some people have said, "Oh, maybe they've added a chemical." I don't know, I literally don't know, but if they if they haven't [added a chemical], they might have just modified the gene sequence so that a different effect than the one we expected to happen will actually happen. And I don't know how we're going to get it out of them. These things are actually very hard.
You know, I don't want to go over this in great depth, but when I first heard that they were using these and intending them as a mass vaccination, when I left Pfizer ten years ago, techniques or materials like this were almost a laboratory curiosity. We did attempt to use them in some experiments in cells and cell culture, and they didn't work very well. There were toxicities associated with them, delivery to the inside of cells was problematic, stability of the material, even identity of what you were adding to the cell culture was often difficult to be really sure about. And so the idea that within ten years [of that time], numerous companies are able to manufacture these like M&Ms and Smarties: that doesn't fit for me. That's not possible.
Wodarg: I think we have we have some big responsibility now, because we we have to spread this news. And I find it very interesting that there is this this webpage where you can find out How Bad Is My Batch.
A: That's one of the people, one of the team.
Wodarg: I tried to find it on Google, but I did not get it. Google hides it. And I have put it on my homepage. You have to have to use a different search engine, and have two different internet programs, to find it. But it's very good: all batches are [listed] there, even the actual ones that I use now that are on the market.
And I have to say to all doctors—please, doctors, now you know that there are dangerous ones and there are less dangerous ones: if you really go on giving those jabs, you should at least have a look whether the batches you got to to inject [patients with] are those which are dangerous, where you kill your patients, or whether they cause less harm.
But also, the pharmacists, what they have in their in their stock: they should have a look and they should they should try to find out. [They] first have to know what sort of batch they had, what sort of batch they they use, and [only] then should they use it and give it. But, you know, every patient too: he should ask his doctor, "Doctor, did you check whether it's a bad batch or not?" And this makes the doctor even [simply] aware that there are bad batches.
And even if the doctor starts thinking, then he will find out: "Why are there bad batches and good batches? This is not possible! If I give an injection and there's some label on it, it should always be the same! What is the patient saying?" And perhaps he'll have a look at this information and will start thinking.
I think this is a very important thing we have to tell the patients: if you are forced to take the jab, ask your doctor, "Doctor is it a good batch or is it a bad batch? No, there are good and bad. I'll show you the literature, doctor. Please tell me, is this a good batch? I won't [take it now]; I'll come back when you can tell me whether it's a good one or a bad one; then i'll come back—but now I won't take it, it's too dangerous stuff." You have to do it like this. And then you can get all those people to start thinking, start researching for themselves what's going on.
Robin Monotti: The one that you're mentioning, we've published one of them on the [Robin Monotti and Mike Yeadon] Telegram channel, and it's howbad.info. There may be more [such websites], but the one that we put on our Telegram channel is howbad.info, so people can check that.
Q: I would like to to ask one additional question. Are we sure that these vaccines are really produced, for instance at a Pfizer plant or a Johnson & Johnson plant? Because there's also companies who do the production process for pharmaceutical company product. For instance, there's a company called Emergent Biosolutions, and I heard—I'm not quite sure—that they are involved in this kind of production process as well.
So it could be that there that it's actually maybe just one plant of a supplier that makes all these vaccines, with the ingredients, according to the protocol of each company—I mean the pseudo-protocol or the seeming protocol, but [that] then we maybe have other protocols going on at the same time. It could be that it's not really at one plant of the visible [end manufacturer].
A: Absolutely right. People may not know this, but yes. Although, during my career, lots of companies acquired one company after another, what they didn't do is keep everybody. I remember, at one point, one of my employers had 47 production plants around the world, and it was clear that was just a consequence of four or five or six companies all rolling up together. So what happened was, over time, some of those plants went through a management buyout, an MBO, and they would acquire several [sites] of the [acquired firm's] estate of manufacturing, and then they would provide a contract manufacturing specialty to the industry—not just their former owners.
And you are right. I won't name them, because it could kind of blacken their name and they might not be involved.
But yes, there is a whole parallel industry of contract manufacturers, and theoretically, of course, their job ought to be highly skilled in regulatory-quality manufacture, and so that lifts the burden off of the drug company. Of course, in the end, what is it the [big-name] drug company does? A friend of mine remarked that it's a bank with a drugstore on the side of it, really.
Wodarg: What about the clinical research organisations? Do you think there are big ones that are able to manage all this?
A: Yes, again, most of the research is is now [farmed] out: so the manufacturer—you know, Moderna [and equivalents] would be in charge of whatever it is that's been done, but the the execution, the recruitment of patients, their screening, the pre-randomisation visits, administering the substance. the daily, weekly, monthly follow-up, and so on: all of that would be managed through a clinical contract research organisation. That's true of toxicology, manufacture, clinical.
And so, in the end, what's the core skill of the drug company? And I can't tell you any more, and that's why a friend said they're like a bank with a drugstore on the side. I really don't know what it is that's at the heart of these organisations any more. It used to be—certainly Pfizer was very famous for having drug discovery at its core, and it was led by people who were generally medicinal chemists rather than biologists. Wellcome was was very much biology-led. There's nothing wrong with either; you have to have those kind of skills.
But what are they led by now? I would think profit motive, and litigation expertise, because they know they're going to get sued, and so as long as they make much more money than they pay in fines, it seems to me that's that's unfortunately the sad end of what used to be an industry I was proud to work in. Not any more. Even if I could, I wouldn't serve any of these organisations anymore. They've permanently done themselves in, in my eyes.
Q: In addition to my question, does it show, on the [patient information] sheets that come with the product, where it's actually been produced?
A: I don't think so. I don't believe so, no. You wouldn't be able to tell whether it was made in New Jersey or, you know, New Amsterdam, whatever. I don't think so. The company will know, because there will be this identifying code and they'd damn well better know not just where it was manufactured; they'd better know where all the raw ingredients came in and who signed off step three. Seriously, if they don't know that stuff, they're breaking the law, because in order to do Good Manufacturing Practice, you need to know the answer to that question.
If even if a skilled investigator said, "I want to know everything about that particular batch, I want to know what was the starting material three months ago and what did you do to warrant that the supplier that sold it to you had the right quality and purity and safety and so on," every part of that needs to be demonstrated.
And that's why I think it cannot be an accident, because the the normal discipline—which is incredibly, it's almost obsessive, and rightly so—means that you can't end up with products with performance variability like this, because that implies different stuff in the vial, and that just can't happen by accident.
But how many actors are involved? It could be lots or a few. So, again, if we were thinking of how could something illegal be hidden, one would think it's not as hard as one might think. It really isn't.
Wodarg: Just let us think. Should I send the state attorney to find out? Where should we look for for the files? Is it [with] the clinical research?
Q: One question, because you [Wodarg] always said that, for instance, the Paul Ehrlich Institute would need to have kept some of the vials for testing—I don't know what the term is is for that—so would they know where these these products were produced?
Wodarg: I think they just rely on the data they get from users, is what they said. They said, "We have a contract with them and they have conditions they have to fulfil, and they have to give us a report, and we rely on the report of the producers." They don't do it themselves, I think, but I don't know.
A: That's exactly right. You rely on the assurances that are made, and the internal—some quality control processes of your supplier or your client, whatever it is, as it passes down the chain, because clearly it's not possible to [check] personally [that] all the starting materials are exactly what you say, so you have a series of nested quality control and audit.
So audits is is the most appropriate way [to discover the chain], because when you do an audit, you can take a cross-section through every, any, part of the Research & Development and commercialisation of a product. And they will do that, experienced people.
Wodarg: Whoever pays that, he has a lot to say.
A: That's a good point, yes, if you end up with the regulators being funded by the drug companies—which I think is true, actually: it's called PDUFA, the [1992 US] Prescription Drug User Fee Act.
Wodarg: Yes, there are some people who undertake the pharmaceutical controls in the German Länder [states]. They have pharmacists who normally control whether what is written on the label is in the drug, but they are not able to to do it now with these new drugs. You have to sequence it, or you have to have special techniques, so it's not possible to control it by that. It is done by those institutions that are normally protecting us from such a thing. They are not able to do it.
A: I agree, yes. The analysis is not as straightforward as it would be in the case of a pill that contains, say, 50 milligrammes of some new antiviral. [In that case,] the chemical structure would be declared, and therefore the analytical performance, the wavelengths of absorption of light, and the molecular sizes of the fragments of it in a mass spectrometer, all of those things, we would know how to confirm that it is what they say.
But [with] these [novel Covid-19 products], I think some of the genetic bases, RNA and DNA, are non-natural. I think they've they've modified them. There's nothing wrong with that as long as you declare it, but what it means is that in order to stabilise the product, some of the bases are non-natural, so they're not found in nature, and some of the analytical techniques won't pick them up. You may need to develop a new methodology even to check the product, so it's tricky, really tricky.
Wodarg: If they were forced to disclose the exact sequences, you could make a PCR to find the sequences.
A: Yes.
Wodarg: And the PCR could be disseminated, and all the control institutions could use the PCR on the drug, and they could see whether the sequences are in it or not—but they would not find those sequences that they don't know [about]; they will only find those sequences which are labelled. And so this doesn't help us.
A: That's right: if you even if you had a pure sample, just a solution, and you wanted to establish what was in it, if you don't know which non-natural nucleic acid—RNA, DNA—if you don't know which ones they've used, you cannot then design an analytical system to sequence it, because it'll be wrong.
There's a serious problem. It really is no good just seizing a sample. You couldn't have the police go in and seize the samples and then a week later we'd know what it is. You can't measure that which you're not even knowing to look for!
Again, that's something I learned in my forensic science placement: it's incredibly difficult to work out what's what's in a person if they've died—or in a vial in this case—unless you have some presumptions. [Once you do have some presumptions,] then you can confirm those or show that it's not true; that's a routine technique. If you don't know, for example, what's killed a person, and you have a suspect death, if you don't know what to look for, it's incredibly hard. The same is true here.
I mean, I could imagine many different schemata that would produce the effect that we've got, but there could be a hundred others, and it might be none of the above. So unless somebody leaks this information, all we can do is present [our findings to] both the public, the professionals—like doctors, Wolfgang, as you said—and the companies themselves.
If someone will hold them legally to account, then yes, then they would have to answer questions as to how these erratically performing batches have come about. That would be my first question [as a legal investigator]. If you agree that that's the record, how did that happen?
Wodarg: With this variation in toxicity, you have enough information to stop all of them.
A: Yes.
Wodarg: Normally, just concerning the legal framework of pharmaceutics, we could now say, "No, not one single jab more, because we have these findings." This is enough—normally.
A: Yes, there's a very good point, actually, [that] I should have made and will make again, in view of the fact that a team has established [these findings]. And these are independent people; we came together because we had this common interest, we didn't come together and then do the work, so these are people who've come from very different skill sets, but we we all agree that there is extreme variation in the toxicity profile; we all agree that.
You may have seen a film called Death by Alphabet [UK Column note: possibly a reference to the film The ABCs of Death], and at least for one manufacturer, it does horribly look as though the ordering of toxicity does relate to the alphabetical sequencing of a middle letter in the code. I'm not in a position to say whether that's true or not, but I can assure you we're doing additional work; additional work is going on. If that were to turn out to be the case, that clearly can't be chance, I don't think. If that's true, that would greatly augment the case.
But yes, Wolfgang, personally I would have been satisfied. As you and I know, back in December 2020, we thought it was inappropriate to use these at all, that it would have been better to have allowed early treatment to have been used, and I think that would have meant only the people who needed the intervention would have received it, and everyone else be left alone; whereas this mass vaccination is introducing dangerous, poorly-characterised materials, that are also now being manufactured in a very suspicious way [and] are being given to a very high percentage of the population.
And, as I've said before, there's already very clear evidence of heavy-duty deception, censoring and control of narrative, which, when you then take that together with these observations of the vaccines, could easily be at the worst end of people's worries—you know, like depopulation.
Certainly, anyone who's heard this now, I think, would be foolish to dismiss the idea that there's a takeover and that they might want to kill quite a percentage of the world's population. That's absolutely possible. I can't know that that's what they're doing, because it's not my crime, as I've said before; but if you just look at the creeping authoritarianism, vaccine passports—I don't know if you've had any other speakers talking about it; I think you had Robert Malone—but just to say again this to anyone who doubts it: if you've been vaccinated—you received double jabs, whatever it is, of one of the products—you're not safer to be next to than I am. You're not! The evidence is, they don't stop you acquiring an infection, so it doesn't do you any good, and it does not stop you transmitting it for example to me.
I, by sheer luck, actually, was ill for a few weeks in the summer, and I had a test and I was positive, so maybe I've had it. And if that's true, I've got good immunity. So I ought to be someone [of whom] you would say, well, I can't give it to anyone, because I can't now get clinically ill with it.
So it's just nonsense, vaccine passports: the only people they benefit are the people who are pushing them, like Gates and Blair and Schwab and other people. They do not make you safer, and it's very important that I say that, because I am very worried that—I don't know what it is that Professor Mattias Desmet said, there's this mass formation, people in greater fear than they should—but it's been pushed for that reason.
If those [mass-formed] people think vaccine passports [work] and people who have been vaccinated are safe to be around, or safer, and I'm a dirty individual that has not been vaccinated—that's not true, but if they believe it—[then] if I try to say, "Look, these vaccine passports are really digital ID and they're they're going to remove your human liberties," they'll fight me, because they'll think I'm trying to remove something that's essential to their safety.
So this is literally a diabolical scheme, because I can see how much resistance there will be to removing vaccine passports if they're introduced into a society.
And so, I know it's easier said than done, but my earnest hope is to stop them being introduced in the first place if you possibly can. It's so much easier to prevent them being installed than to remove them afterwards. I don't know how to get rid of them.
The final instalment, Part V, is here.