Dealing With Domestic Extremism

The London bombings of the 7th July 2005 presented senior officers of the police and security forces with an opportunity to make major changes to those organisations – and to lobby for changes to the law. Those changes have been orchestrated by members of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) working in close collaboration with the Government, the Home Office, and the Security Service (MI5). It was the London bombings, especially, that provided State agencies with a way of linking “domestic extremism” (in the public mind, in particular) to actual or intended acts of public disorder, violence, and terrorism.

Changes to the police force since the London bombings have resulted in the creation of a UK-wide network of specialist units tasked with combating domestic extremism and terrorism – namely, the Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs).2 3 4 Control of the CT network is under the supervision of an ACPO-appointed National Co-ordinator.

The lead for counter terrorism has been given to the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). The CTC is, in effect, an enhanced variant of a CTU with local (London), national (UK), and international responsibilities. The police Confidential Intelligence Unit (CIU) works within the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), whilst the NPOIU forms a part of the National Co-ordinator Domestic Extremism (NCDE) section of the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC). The CIU manages and directs the operational strategy for the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS, the use of infiltrators, informants, and agent provocateur assets).

Multi-force CT operations are, in principle, under the control of the National Co-ordinator Terrorism Investigations (NCTI) – and hence under the control of the MPS/London-based CTC. However each Chief Constable has the final say in regard to providing local resources in support of any co-operative CT effort.

Each CTU and CTIU works in close collaboration with local MI5 Regional Stations, via police liaison officers and embedded MI5 staff. The bases for collaboration between the police CT units and MI5 was initially formalised within a Security Service Intelligence Agreement, first drafted at the end of 2005. In the period September 2001 to July 2005 an enhancement process for MI5 Regional Stations was undertaken, and post July 2005 was significantly accelerated through the ‘Operation EXTEND’ programme. In addition, the CTUs and CTIUs have been in receipt of expert advice, and practical support, from members of the Special Counter Intelligence Team of the Army Intelligence Corps (Military Intelligence) – an arrangement that was effectively in place by the autumn of 2005.

There are now in excess of 3,000 police officers dedicated to CT and associated matters.

It might seem rather naïve to question the need for such an extensive CT capability. However, it isn’t – any proper examination of such developments requires an honest appraisal of root causes. This is especially so, given that we find “domestic extremism” being treated as part of the same problem as that of acts of (murderous) terrorism.


The State Authorities insist that events such as the 2005 London bombings can be attributed to the “radicalisation” of sections of the population. That is simply a puerile attempt to create a ‘false narrative’. What will not be admitted is that it is the State’s own crude efforts to engineer extreme social change that has made it possible for ‘violent radicalism’ to become an entrenched domestic problem.

The State’s political agenda embraces hyper-diversity, moral relativism, the undermining of Christian belief and tradition, the unlawful engagement in foreign wars (and in war crimes), and the dismantling of national sovereignty (High Treason). It is an extreme political agenda that requires an effective abandonment of Common Law and the Constitution, in favour of a top-down imposition of authoritarian State control.

Those engaged in front-line CT work know only too well that their efforts are being exploited to give an appearance of both legitimacy and authority to a treacherous political-elite. Therefore the expectation is of the State being keen to pursue extreme political policy and to embark on further overseas military ventures – thereby ensuring that a threat of domestic terrorism continues far into the future.

Not surprisingly, and despite the change of UK Government in 2010, there will be no changes to the core political agenda of the State, or the agencies of the State. It is expected that the police and judiciary will continue to support extreme social change and State treason – and will also continue to criminalise those ‘extremists’ who dissent from, or show resistance, to that process. The common people are to be allowed to protest – but only under tightly controlled conditions, and under a compulsion to ‘contract’ with the police. An extremist, criminal State cannot allow the people to reclaim the Law for themselves.